
Here is my breakdown of the incident:

## 1. Chronological Timeline of Events
* **03:14:18 - 03:14:22 UTC:** User `jmartinez` logs into the corporate VPN from Amsterdam, Netherlands (`185.220.101.47`). MFA (TOTP) is successful, but Azure AD flags the risk level as **Medium**.
* **03:15:04 UTC:** A network logon (Type 3) is recorded from the user's internal IP (`10.10.2.114`) to the Domain Controller (`ACME-DC01`).
* **03:15:31 - 03:16:44 UTC:** Rapid authentication attempts and connections to sensitive servers (`ACME-FILE01`, `ACME-FILE02`, and `ACME-SQL01`) using `net.exe`.
* **03:17:12 - 03:17:45 UTC:** The user executes `net group "Domain Admins" /domain` via `cmd.exe`. CrowdStrike triggers a medium-severity alert for suspicious reconnaissance.

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## 2. Suspicious Elements & Why
* **Source IP (185.220.101.47):** This IP is a known **Tor Exit Node**. While the MFA was successful, legitimate corporate traffic rarely originates from the Tor network.
* **Rapid Lateral Movement:** Within roughly 90 seconds, the account touched a Domain Controller, two file servers, and a SQL database. This "shotgun" approach to accessing network shares is classic post-exploitation behavior.
* **Reconnaissance Commands:** The command `net group "Domain Admins" /domain` is a standard manual discovery technique used by attackers to map out high-value targets within an Active Directory environment.
* **Atypical Time:** The activity is occurring at 03:15 UTC (roughly 10:15 PM ET or 3:15 AM in many European regions), which may be outside the user’s normal working hours.

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## 3. Most Likely Explanation
This appears to be a **Credential Compromise/Account Takeover**. 
The attacker likely obtained `jmartinez`’s credentials (and potentially bypassed or phished the TOTP token) and is using a Tor connection to mask their true location. They are currently in the **Discovery and Lateral Movement** phase of an attack, looking for where the "keys to the kingdom" (Domain Admin rights) reside.

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## 4. Severity: High
While the individual alerts (Azure, CrowdStrike) are marked "Medium," the **contextual correlation** elevates this to **High**. 
* **Reasoning:** The attacker has already successfully bypassed MFA and is actively enumerating the Domain Admins group from an internal workstation. If not stopped, the next step is likely an attempt at privilege escalation or data exfiltration.

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## 5. Next Steps (Next 30 Minutes)
1.  **Isolate the Host:** Immediately isolate `LAPTOP-JM04` (`10.10.2.114`) via the CrowdStrike console to prevent further lateral movement.
2.  **Disable the Account:** Disable the `jmartinez` Active Directory account and revoke all active O365/Azure sessions to kill the VPN tunnel.
3.  **Reset Credentials:** Force a password reset and re-enrollment of MFA for this user.
4.  **Verify User Location:** Contact the real Jose Martinez (via a secondary channel like a phone call) to confirm if they are currently traveling in the Netherlands or using Tor.
5.  **Expand Scope:** Check `ACME-FILE01/02` and `ACME-SQL01` for any unusual file access or data transfers that occurred during those specific logon windows.

